Of the names that are applied in multiple ways, some are applied in one manner, some in another. And some things, which we call 'homonymous', contain the duality in their names, while others, which philosophers call 'ambiguous', in their account. [...] And some things are manifestly homonymous, while others are [sc. merely] ambiguous. For example, science, insofar as [it is proper] of many things, means many things and is ambiguous. For one and the same science is thus [proper] of many things, such as the end and the means to the end. For instance, architecture is the science of a building as the end and of the things through which a building comes to be [built], things that are indeed means to the end. Therefore, the same [science is proper] of many things. Similarly, medicine also [belongs to] things productive of health, such as diet, an incision, a cautery, and many other things.