In reference to those who bring evils on themselves.[1]
kaq' au(to/ ["for itself"] ....... di' au(to/ ["because of itself"]
e(te/rou e(/neken ["for the sake of another"] ..... di' a)/llo ["because of something else"].[2]
The first antithesis is taken from the efficient causes, the second from the final [causes]: as we have sight for itself, but wealth not for itself, but because of something else. Likewise for the other antithesis: for we pursue virtue because of itself,[3] and not for the sake of something else. For even if there is no profit, [virtue] itself is worth pursuing for itself, but we have strength not because of itself,[4] but for the sake of something else. If [we have] something because of itself, [we] must certainly also [have it] for itself. But if [we have] something for itself, [we do] not necessarily [have it] because of itself. For example, the soul has virtue because of itself, and also for itself. For the efficient cause of virtue is in the soul itself, for it does not need anything from outside to attain virtue. Likewise the body has health as a good because of itself, and for this reason has it also for itself. But it is not the case that what [is obtained] for itself [is] itself also [obtained] because of itself. For the soul has sight for itself, but not indeed because of itself, but because of virtue or because of being safe. Likewise also if something [is obtained] because of something else, [it is] necessarily also [obtained] for the sake of something else; but not conversely. For wealth [is obtained] because of commerce or some such activity, and it is [obtained] for the sake of something else (for it is often [obtained] for the sake of virtue). Sight however and health are [obtained] for the sake of something else, not because of something else but for themselves. For that which is [obtained] because of something else is opposed to that which is [obtained] for itself; and that which is [obtained] for the sake of something else [is opposed to] that which is [obtained] for itself.[5] But it is possible for that which is [obtained] for itself to be coincidentally [obtained] because of something else. For health belongs to the body for itself, but it might be also [obtained] because of something else coincidentally, for example because of a doctor who removes from the body that which is harmful. He prevents that which injures, but when the nature of that which is troublesome is changed, it brings about the natural health. And virtue, which is to be preferred because of itself, might [be preferred] coincidentally for the sake of a good reputation. And someone might say that virtue is [obtained] because of reputation, but not for itself; but [this is true only] coincidentally. Likewise one might say that health, which is preferable for the body because of itself, is [obtained] for the sake of something else coincidentally, that is for the sake of doing this or that.