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The philosophers use this term rather generally both for declensions[1] of any kind and for [grammatical] constructions. Nowadays, of course, they do not use the term this way, but [they call] inflections[2] and derivatives[3] 'coordinates',[4] which, though they seem to be related to each other, are [actually] different. They also call 'inflections' those things that are configured particularly, not according to [other] things, such as grammatikw=s ['grammatically'].[5] For this is an inflection of grammatiko/n ['grammatical']. Similarly [in the case of] dikai/ws ['justly'], mousikw=s ['musically'], froni/mws ['prudently'], andrei/ws ['courageously'], for these are inflections of di/kaion ['just'], mousiko/n ['musical'], andrei=on ['courageous'], fro/nimon ['prudent']. And the traditional rule is as follows. If the inflection of something of any sort has multiple meanings, the thing itself also [has] multiple meanings, and if the thing itself [is that way], the inflection [is] as well. For example, since the inflexion of 'just' is 'justly', if 'justly' has multiple meanings, so, accordingly, does 'just'.[6] 'Justly' has multiple meanings, for he who decides according to his own understanding is said to have decided justly by revealing that which seems just to him, even though this is not just in that sense. [In a different manner] he is also said to have decided justly who decides as he ought to. But he who is obedient to the law is also [said to have decided justly], even if what is just is not truly like that. Therefore, 'just' is included among the things that have muliple meanings and [has] just as many meanings, in accordance, that is, with each [of the meanings] of 'justly': 'in accordance with one's understanding' and 'as one ought' and '[as is] legal'. It is clear that the rule is convertible,[7] for if 'just' itself also has many meanings, the inflection deriving from it, the [adverb] 'justly', also [has] many meanings.
According to grammarians an inflexion is an alteration occuring in the ending of a noun or noun-form.
Also [sc. attested is] ptw/ssontes ['they cowering'], [meaning they] being afraid.[8]
Also [sc. attested is the corresponding feminine accusative singular] ptw/ssousan, ['cowering']: [meaning] being afraid, hiding herself. "When walking by the well-wooded entirety of a tree, I drew it out with my hand as it cowered [ptw/ssousan] in the leaves of the Bacchic vine."[9]

*ptw/seis: ou(/tw le/gousi koino/teron oi( filo/sofoi kai\ ta\s o(pwsou=n e)gkli/seis te kai\ e)kfora/s, ou) mh\n kai\ nu=n ou(/tws, a)ll' e)sti\ su/stoixa kai\ ptw/seis kai\ parw/numa, parakei=sqai me\n a)llh/lois dokou=nta, diafe/ronta de/. kai\ ptw/seis le/gousi ta\ i)di/ws ou) para/ tina e)sxhmatisme/na, w(s to\ grammatikw=s: ptw=sis ga\r tou=to tou= grammatiko/n: o(moi/ws tw=| dikai/ws kai\ mousikw=s kai\ froni/mws kai\ a)ndrei/ws: ptw/seis ga\r tau=ta tou= di/kaion, mousiko/n, a)ndrei=on, fro/nimon. e)/sti dh\ o( paradido/menos to/pos toiou=tos: a)\n h( ptw=sis tino\s h)=| o(pwsou=n legome/nh pleonaxw=s, kai\ au)to\ pleonaxw=s, kai\ ei) au)to/, kai\ h( ptw=sis. oi(=on e)pei\ tou= dikai/ou to\ dikai/ws ptw=sis, a)\n to\ dikai/ws pleonaxw=s, kai\ to\ di/kaion, kai\ e)/mpalin. le/getai de\ to\ dikai/ws pleonaxw=s: o(/ te ga\r kata\ th\n e(autou= gnw/mhn kri/nas kai\ to\ do/can au)tw=| di/kaion ei)=nai a)pofhna/menos dikai/ws le/getai kekrike/nai, ka)\n mh\ ou(/tws di/kaion h)=| tou=to. le/getai dikai/ws kekrike/nai kai\ o( w(s dei= kri/nas: a)lla\ kai\ o( tw=| no/mw| peisqei/s, ka)\n mh\ to\ tai=s a)lhqei/ais di/kaion ou(/tws e)/xh|. kai\ to\ di/kaion ou)=n tw=n pleonaxw=s legome/nwn kai\ tosautaxw=s: kaq' e(/kaston ga\r tw=n dikai/ws: to/ te ga\r kata\ th\n e(autou= gnw/mhn kai\ to\ w(s dei= di/kaion toiou=ton kai\ to\ no/mimon. kai\ dh=lon, o(/ti a)ntistre/fei o( to/pos: kai\ ga\r ei) au)to\ pa/lin pleonaxw=s to\ di/kaion, kai\ h( ptw=sis h( a)p' au)tou=, to\ dikai/ws, pleonaxw=s. kata\ grammatikou\s ptw=sis e)sti\n o)no/matos h)\ o)nomatikou= tinos kata\ to\ te/los ki/nhsis genome/nh. kai\ *ptw/ssontes, deiliw=ntes. kai\ *ptw/ssousan, deiliw=san, kruptome/nhn. pa=n de\ kat' eu)/dendron stei/bwn druo/s, ei)/rusa xeiri\ ptw/ssousan *bromi/as oi)na/dos e)n peta/lois.

The first and principal paragraph of this entry is taken (with some variations and omissions) from Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentaries on Aristotle's Topica 103.30-104.28, which is commenting on Aristotle, Topica 106b29ff.
[1] The Greek is e)/gklisis, 'declension', 'inflection' or 'any derivative form', such as the mood of a verb. See Apollonius Dyscolus, Syntax 248.14, and especially Dionysius Thrax, Grammar 1.1.48-53. The latter interestingly maintains that the verb (r(h=ma) is accompanied by: (1) eight 'moods' (e)gkli/seis): the verbal moods themselves, which are divided into (a) indicative (o(ristikh/) (b) imperative (prostaktikh/), (c) optative (eu)ktikh/), (d) subjunctive (u(potaktikh/), and (e) infinitive (a)pare/mfatos); (2) dispositions (diaqe/seis), which are divided into: (a) active (e)ne/rgeia): 'I beat'; (b) passive (pa/qos): 'I am beaten', and (c) middle (voice) (meso/ths): 'I have fixed in/on' (peph/ga), 'I made/created' (e)poihsa/mhn), 'I wrote' (e)graya/mhn); (3) forms or types (ei)/dh): prototype (prwto/typon) like 'I furnish drink for' a)/rdw and derivative (para/gwgon) like a)rdeu/w; (4) figures (sxh/mata), which can be simple, compound, or formed from a compound; (5) numbers, which can be singular ('I beat'), dual ('both of you beat'), and plural ('we beat'); (6) persons: first, second, third; (7) times: present, past, future; (8) conjugations.
[2] The examples of ptw=sis that can be found in Aristotle are both nominal inflections ("'Philo's' or 'to Philo', and all those things that are of this sort are not names [o)no/mata], but inflections [ptw/seis] of a name"; De interpretatione 16a32-16b1) and verbal inflections ("Every declarative enunciation must exist out of a verb or out of its inflection. For even the enunciation of man is not yet a declarative enunciation unless 'is' or 'will be' or 'was' or something of this sort is added"; De interpretatione 17a9-12). For Aristotle an 'inflection' is any set of forms derived from the same lexeme. In Topica 114a33ff Aristotle says that inflections are things like 'justly', 'courageously', 'healthily', and such as are said in this way. He also adds that the forms that correspond to inflections are 'coordinates'; for example, 'justly' is coordinate in relation to justice, 'courageously' in relation to courage, and so on (Topica 114a34-36).
[3] According to Aristotle, things that get their names from something but differ in their inflection are called 'derivative' [paronu/mous]; for instance, the grammarian gets his name from 'grammar', the courageous person gets his name from 'courage' (see Categories 1a12-15).
[4] By 'coordinates' (su/stoixa) Aristotle means things such as the following: just actions and the just person are coordinate with 'justice', courageous actions and the courageous person are coordinate with courage (Topica 114a27-29).
[5] Alexander's text (104.13-14) reads "Inflections are those things that are particularly configured thus [rather than 'not'] along with [other] things, such 'grammatically'", which makes a better sense.
[6] This is so, Aristotle says, because according to each person who acts 'justly' there will be a just person (Topica 106b31).
[7] For this expression in Aristotle, see Topica 109b25; 115a33; b17.
[8] Likewise or similarly in other lexica; references at Photius pi1495, where Theodoridis tentatively follows Naber's view that this participle is quoted from Homer, Iliad 7.129. However, it is masculine accusative plural there; for a nominative see a phrase of Tyrtaeus (fr.11.36) preserved in Stobaeus.
[9] Greek Anthology 7.193.1-2 = Sim(m)ias of Rhodes (sigma 431) fr.19 Powell. Reading with Powell th/nde for pa=n de/ and dri/os for druo/s produces a more satisfactory translation: "walking through this well-wooded grove I drew it out ...". On this epigram, a recollection of capturing a grasshopper (or a locust), see also Gow and Page (vol. I, 178), (vol. II, 512), and another extract at epsilon 3441.

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