Philoponus, Commentary on Aristotle's de anima 5.24-33 Hayduck; cf. alpha 1315, pi 2376.
[1] Wish (bou/lhsis) and choice (proai/resis) are closely related each other. These terms had a crucial importance in Greek moral philosophy, especially from Aristotle onwards. According to Aristotle, a wish is a rational desire for what is thought to be good as an end in itself (EN 1111b26, 1113a2; see also De anima 433a23, Topica 146b5, and EN 1111b19). For its part, choice is the result of a wish; it is the desire for performing an action that deliberation (bou/leusis) has shown to be the appropriate action to achieve the desired end (EN 1112b26). Aristotle characterizes choice as follows: "Since the object of choice, which is an object of deliberation and desire, is among those things depending on us, choice also will be a deliberative desire (bouleutikh\ o)/recis) for those things depending on us" (EN 1113a9-11).
[2] Philoponus has pro\s both times rather than the Suda's pro\.
[3] Philoponus' text here reads logikai\ ... duna/meis "rational faculties". For the continuation of this discussion, concerning irrational faculties, see phi 84. If this passage is examined from an Aristotelian point of view, it is not very clear why wish belongs to the domain of the rational and choice to the domain of the irrational, since for Aristotle choice presupposes, to some extent, the notion of wish. See the Bibliography below for a selection of the most significant discussions of this issue.